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When the Zimbabwean government launched the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) 
in 1999, an international outcry followed, with Zimbabwe described as an international pariah 
state. Zimbabwe entered a prolonged socio-economic and political crisis. While conventional 
opposition attacks the FTLRP for its negative impacts on agriculture, food security and 
economic growth, this article argues that the programme has also had widespread impacts on 
access to housing land. Over the years, the main political tool used by the ruling Zimbabwe 
African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]) was land, especially in rural areas. 
Later, especially in urban and peri-urban areas, ZANU(PF) used peri-urban farms to bolster 
its waning support in the urban constituencies. Through ZANU(PF)-aligned co-operatives 
and land barons, the party became a major player in deciding who had access to land for 
housing. On the other hand, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) tried 
to use its majority control of urban areas to give its supporters land for housing, albeit with 
limited success. MDC-controlled urban administrations were incapacitated, as most urban 
land was under a de facto ZANU(PF) administration. This article focuses in particular on the 
allocation of housing land between 2000 and 2012 in Zimbabwe’s major cities. The ZANU(PF) 
approach to housing bypassed urban planning regulations, with catastrophic effects on urban 
infrastructure planning. Further, the article explains developments in council-led housing and 
the role of non-council actors in housing provision. The Zimbabwean experience shows that 
it is not enough for a political party to be voted into power; rather, controlling resources such 
as land is a vital consideration in urban governance and development.
Introduction
The challenges of urbanisation and housing in African cities are well defined. One of the 
prominent challenges is the informalisation of cities, in which informal housing and eco-
nomic activities are dominant. In urban literature, there is a wide acceptance of the growth of 
informal settlements and the informalisation of formal settlements in African cities.1 As such, 
many of the cities and towns in Africa south of the Sahara are dealing with crises which are 
compounded by: rapid population growth, particularly in peri-urban areas; lack of access to 
 1  See, for example, S. Bekker and G. Therborn (eds), Power and Powerlessness: Capital Cities in Africa (Cape 
Town, HSRC Press and CODESRIA, 2012); P. Harrison, A. Todes and V. Watson, Planning and Transformation: 
Learning from the Post- Apartheid Experience (New York, Routledge, 2008); R. Grant, Globalizing City: The 
Urban and Economic Transformation of Accra, Ghana (Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 2009).
© 2015 The Editorial Board of the Journal of Southern African Studies
*  Some of the interviews used in this article were conducted during field research for an MPhil dissertation sub-
mitted (November 2013) to the School of Government, University of the Western Cape. All interviews were 
conducted by the author.
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shelter, infrastructure and services by predominantly poor populations; weak local governments; 
and serious environmental issues.2 Further, the United Nations Human Settlement Programme 
(UN–Habitat) proposes that ‘as the urbanisation of African poverty makes further progress, the 
prospects of a dignified and productive life continues to elude the poorest among Africans’.3 
Growing informality presents city governments with opportunities to devise new, innovative and 
inclusive urban development and housing methods. At the same time, increasing informality 
creates severe challenges of urban services provision.
Mike Davis points to a disturbing picture of African cities, with more than 75 per cent of 
the urban population in Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan living in slums.4 However, such 
figures have been refuted by Garth Myers, who questioned the data sources, data authenticity, 
and the lack of a functional definition of what constitutes a slum.5 Despite this, UN–Habitat 
argues most recently that the average African urban population living in slum areas was 61.7 
per cent in 2012.6 The prevalence of slums demonstrates the extent and magnitude of the 
housing challenge in African cities. Further, the decreasing state engagement in low-income 
housing in sub-Saharan Africa has ‘resulted in increasing informalisation of housing provision 
for the majority of urban dwellers, while the minority benefit from increased formal housing 
market activity’.7
Academic views on African urbanisation are diverse. Afro-pessimists argue that urbanisa-
tion without development is what has contributed to the image of African cities as degrading, 
irrecoverable and hopeless places.8 Other scholars argue that African cities are characterised 
by ‘unregulated growth, limited opportunities for gainful employment in the formal economy, 
severe environmental degradation, lack of decent and affordable housing, failing and neglected 
infrastructure, absence of basic social services, pauperisation, criminality, negligent city- 
management, and increasing inequalities’.9 This in itself shows an urban crisis in perpetuity. 
These challenges are taking place against the backdrop of weak, underfunded and often con-
tested urban governments.
Simon Bekker and Goran Therborn point to sub-Saharan African cities as portraying ‘pow-
erlessness to implement one’s own plans; powerlessness in front of massive immigration; 
in terms of pervasive informality and the basic service demands of exploding populations; 
powerlessness in front of ethnopolitical violence’, making Africa a continent of slum cities.10 
The capacity of African cities to manage and respond to urbanisation is often weak, presenting 
enormous challenges of service provision. Central to the management of urbanisation and the 
provision of services is the relationship between central and urban governments. In present-day 
urban political realities, service delivery is used as a source and resource for political agency. 
For example, in the period since 2010, city council struggles in Lusaka, Zambia arose from 
 2  V. Watson, ‘“The Planned City Sweeps the Poor Away …”: Urban Planning and 21st Century Urbanisation’, 
Progress in Planning, 72, 3 (2009), pp. 151–93.
 3  UN–Habitat, State of African Cities 2010: Governance, Inequality and Urban Land Markets (Nairobi, UN–Habitat, 
2010), p. 2.
 4  M. Davis, Planet of Slums (London, Verso, 2005).
 5  A.G. Myers, African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice (London and New York, Zed 
Books, 2011).
 6  UN–Habitat, Global Report on Human Settlements 2013: Planning and Design for Sustainable Urban Mobility 
(Nairobi, UN–Habitat, 2013).
 7  P. Jenkins, H. Smith and P.Y. Wang, Planning and Housing in the Rapidly Urbanising World (London and New 
York, Routledge, 2007), p. 229.
 8  F. Locatelli and P. Nugent, ‘Introduction’, in F. Locatelli and P. Nugent (eds), African Cities: Competing Claims 
on Urban Spaces (Leiden, Brill, 2009), pp. 1–13.
 9  M.J. Murray and A.G. Myers (eds), Cities in Contemporary Africa (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 1.
 10  S. Bekker and G. Therborn, ‘Conclusion’, in Bekker and Therborn (eds), Power and Powerlessness, p. 194.
Land for Housing 1221
inter-party power politics, with the party in power nationally actively constraining the opposi-
tion-led city council in order to prevent it from developing successful initiatives and creating 
a springboard for future electoral victory at national level.11 Consequently, ‘cities are sites of 
contestation marked by deeply contested politics’.12 Moreover, Daniel Esser argues that the 
political impasse prevalent in African cities governed by opposition parties is a result of incom-
plete decentralisation, in which the devolution of functions is not matched with a re-allocation 
of resources.13 Thus the democratisation and resource autonomy of urban governments is critical 
to the delivery of urban services and the functioning of cities.
In order to understand how entrenched political struggles between central and local govern-
ments affect the functioning of cities, we need to focus our analysis on the delivery of urban 
services in such contested environments. Zimbabwe’s major cities provide an opportunity for 
such analysis. Urban governance is seemingly entangled in the contested realms of socio- 
economic and political relations of power. The delivery of urban services such as housing is 
thus politicised and highly contested, as this article demonstrates.
Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) began in earnest in 2000. Land 
reform had lasting repercussions for the governance and development of Zimbabwe. At the 
same time, the urban political landscape witnessed the emergence, ascendancy and dominance 
of the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in the running of urban 
affairs, to the consternation of the ruling party, ZANU(PF). It was unimaginable for a party 
in government to lack a presence in local government.14 The absence of central government 
representation at local level made political players at central government level wary of losing 
political support, fearing the road to political exit. The fear emanated from the perception of a 
rival in creation: the problem was no longer simply about the functions of local government, 
but about political infighting and survival.15 The governance of urban areas became hotly con-
tested, turning urban councils into significant sites of political struggle.
There are acute housing shortages in Zimbabwe’s urban areas. The housing challenge is 
constrained by a number of factors, chief among them the availability of suitable and affordable 
land. In this regard, the government of Zimbabwe admits that there are problems ‘associated 
with blockages to availability and actual delivery of land for low-cost and/or low-income 
housing’.16 Principally, this places whoever has control of land for housing in a powerful posi-
tion. Most peri-urban farms are under the control of central government and, by extension, 
ZANU(PF), making the party a major player in urban land allocation.
Ordinarily and at law, land allocation functions reside in local authorities and central gov-
ernment through the state land office. However, since 2000, countering the prominence of the 
MDC in governing cities and urban areas, a new approach to housing land allocation emerged. 
Suddenly, local authorities were unable to perform land allocation functions, with ZANU(PF) 
party structures reigning supreme. Land in urban areas was used as a way of managing the 
ordinary person’s political life, through chanting ZANU(PF) slogans and songs at most housing 
 11  D. Resnick, ‘In the Shadow of the City: Africa’s Urban Poor in Opposition Strongholds’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 49, 1 (2011), pp. 141–66.
 12  J. Robinson, Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development (London, Routledge, 2006).
 13  D.E. Esser, ‘“When We Launched the Government’s Agenda …”: Aid Agencies and Local Politics in Urban 
Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 50, 3 (2012), pp. 397–420.
 14  A.Y. Kamete, ‘The Return of the Jettisoned: ZANU(PF)’s Crack at “Re-Urbanizing” in Harare’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 32, 2 (2006), pp. 255–71.
 15  Kamete, ‘The Return of the Jettisoned’, p. 257; M. Keating, ‘Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, 
Fragmentation and Public Choice’, in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman (eds), Theories of Urban Problems 
(London, Sage, 1995), pp. 117–34.
 16  Government of Zimbabwe, Second National Housing Convention Report, 29–30 October 2009, Elephant Hills 
Hotel, Victoria Falls (Harare, Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities, 2009), p. xiv.
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gatherings. This article explores how ZANU(PF) managed to manipulate the system of land 
allocation. Attention is given to the process of land allocation, conditions attached and the 
consequences for urban planning and development.
This research was conducted in the cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare. The 
article is based on 31 interviews conducted with people drawn from urban councils (mayors 
and councillors), administrative heads of city departments, practising planners within and 
outside government ministries and departments, international development agencies, com-
munity-based and civil society organisations, political parties, and research institutes training 
urban governance professionals.17
The Defeat of ZANU(PF) and MDC Ascendancy in Urban 
Administration 
The period after 2000 saw the demise of ZANU(PF) hegemony in urban administration. At 
the same time, it saw the rise of the MDC in controlling urban local authorities. The contest 
between ZANU(PF) and the MDC over the administration of urban areas grew in importance. 
For ZANU(PF), the situation was unbecoming and ‘intolerable’, as MDC control of urban 
areas grew with each election. Thus ZANU(PF) tried to wrest back control over MDC-run local 
authorities, and a ‘cat and mouse’ relationship ensued between the two. Dele Olowu argues 
that, within a decade, most of the elements of good governance had been eroded as a result of 
the power struggle at the national centre, and of legislative changes to neutralise the growing 
power of the opposition to the ruling party, especially in Bulawayo and Harare.18 In particular, 
ZANU(PF) used three instruments to undermine the functioning of MDC-controlled urban 
councils: the local government minister; changes to the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29: 15); 
and ZANU(PF) party structures, including youth militia.
The battle to control urban areas resulted in the sacking of opposition executive mayors and 
their replacement with commissions loyal to ZANU(PF).19 Historian Terence Ranger narrates 
the ordeal as:
Elected executive mayors have been dismissed; whole municipal councils have been sacked; com-
missions appointed by the state have attempted to run cities. A whole series of new state authorities 
– governors for both Harare and Bulawayo; district administrators for the townships – have been 
inserted above and into the cities.20
In the capital city, Harare, after the sacking of the mayor, Elias Mudzuri, in April 2003, and 
the subsequent resignation of a number of councillors in protest, the situation became worse 
as of December 2004, when not enough elected councillors remained to make a quorum.21 The 
local government minister appointed commissioners to run city affairs in accordance with the 
Urban Councils Act. These commissioners were ZANU(PF) senior officials, and their term 
was continually extended in contravention of the Urban Council Act. Chirisa and Jonga sum 
 17  These are 5 from central government ministries, 5 from urban social movements, 6 from local authorities, 7 from 
non-governmental organisations and international development agencies, 3 from political parties and 5 from 
consultancy, practising planners and research institutes.
 18  D. Olowu, ‘Decentralization and Local Government in the Zimbabwean Constitution’, in N. Kersting (ed), 
Constitution in Transition: Academic Inputs for a New Constitution in Zimbabwe (Harare, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
2009), pp.117–18.
 19  Mayors sacked and replaced by ZANU(PF) commissions are Elias Mudzuri (Harare), Misheck Shoko (Chitungwiza), 
Francis Dhlakama (Chegutu) and Misheck Kagurabadza (Mutare).
 20  T.O. Ranger, ‘City Versus State in Zimbabwe: Colonial Antecedents of the Current Crisis’, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies, 1, 2 (July 2007), p. 1.
 21  A.Y. Kamete, ‘For Enhanced Civic Participation in Local Governance: Calling Tyranny to Account in Harare’, 
Environment and Urbanization, 21, 1 (2009), pp. 59–75.
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it as the ‘defeat of democracy in council business’;22 while Kamete describes it as an assault 
on democracy.23
In June 2006, Zimbabwe’s government issued a directive compelling all local authorities to 
transfer all water and sewerage services to a parastatal, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
(ZINWA), at zero cost. One can argue that the drastic shift was meant to weaken MDC-run 
local authorities. Urban councils lost substantial amounts of revenue, as water had been a cash 
cow. Further, the government of Zimbabwe ‘continued to treat ZINWA as an extension of itself, 
financially propping it up, and defending it to the hilt even in the face of palpable operational 
deficiencies to further its political objectives’.24 In mid 2008, a cholera epidemic claimed more 
than 4,000 lives.25 In January 2009, the government backtracked, and water and sewerage 
functions were handed back to local authorities. However, the move attracted resistance from 
ZINWA, since the parastatal did not want to relinquish assets and power to local authorities. As 
of 2014, those urban councils whose water is still under ZINWA control provide operational 
challenges between themselves and the parastatal.26
In 2008, the Urban Councils Act was amended to include (i) the abolition of the executive 
mayoral system and re-introduction of the ceremonial mayoral system, and (ii) the appointment 
of special interests councillors, as well as the appointment, by the local government minister, of 
ceremonial mayors who did not have to be councillors.27 Reversion to the ceremonial mayoral 
system was apparently an attempt to scuttle the power and control of MDC executive mayors 
in managing urban affairs. Further, section 114 of the Urban Councils Act gives the local 
government minister the powers to suspend and dismiss elected councillors. Thus a political 
party in control of central government can (ab)use section 114 to frustrate citizen’s choices 
at local authority level. During the Inclusive Government (2009–13), ZANU(PF) retained the 
local government ministry, with Ignatius Chombo as the minister. The minister used these 
powers to dismiss democratically elected councillors, thereby overshadowing the will of the 
local citizens.28
To cement ZANU(PF)’s control over urban areas, the party used unfettered powers of 
the local government minister, such as appointing special interest councillors and senior city 
management staff, setting conditions of service for councillors and staff, and suspending and 
dismissing councillors. Many felt that special interest councillors brought nothing special to 
council chambers except ZANU(PF) loyalty. In conformance with Statutory Instrument 94 of 
2010, Minister Chombo appointed 86 special interest councillors, to complement the 389 elected 
councillors. It emerged, however, that ‘most appointed councillors in urban councils turned 
out to be ZANU(PF) candidates who had lost elections’.29 In brief, special interest councillors 
 22  I. Chirisa and W. Jonga, ‘Urban Local Governance in the Crucible: Empirical Overtones of Central Government 
Meddling in Local Urban Councils Affairs in Zimbabwe’, Theoretical and Empirical Research in Urban 
Management, 3, 12 (August 2009), p. 176.
 23  A. Kamete, ‘In Defence of National Sovereignty? Urban Governance and Democracy in Zimbabwe’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 21, 2 (2003), pp. 193–213.
 24  M. Musemwa, ‘From “Sunshine City” to a Landscape of Disaster: The Politics of Water, Sanitation and Disease 
in Harare, Zimbabwe, 1980–2009’, Journal of Developing Societies, 26, 2 (2010), pp. 165-206.
 25  ICG, Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government, African Briefing No. 59 (Brussels, International Crisis 
Group, 2009).
 26  These include the following towns: Karoi, Hwange, Gwanda, Mutoko, Mvurwi, Gokwe, Chivhu and Plumtree.
 27  Chirisa and Jonga, ‘Urban Local Governance in the Crucible’.
 28  Examples include the dismissal of 16 MDC councillors between September 2008 and January 2011 by the 
local government ministry; see N. Musekiwa, ‘The Role of Local Authorities in Democratic Transitions’, in 
E.V. Masunungure and J.M. Shumba (eds), Zimbabwe: Mired in Transition (Harare, Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative for Zimbabwe and Weaver Press, 2012), pp. 230–51.
 29  Ibid., p. 245.
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were there to protect ZANU(PF) interests and make MDC-controlled urban councils ungov-
ernable.30 The role of ZANU(PF) through the local government ministry was not, it seemed, to 
foster service delivery. Rather it appeared to be aimed at making MDC-run urban councils fail.
The March 2008 elections brought major changes to the governance of urban councils. All 
municipalities, town councils and town boards remained MDC strongholds, with the MDC 
winning the majority of ward seats.31 In particular, the MDC won 29 and ZANU(PF) one out 
of the 30 urban councils.32 This indicates the total rejection of ZANU(PF) and the trust given 
to the MDC by the urban electorate. In practice, the election result ushered in another ‘urban 
governance war’, as ZANU(PF) launched a spirited comeback. The problems of governing 
urban areas were further compounded by the ‘spatial unruliness’ of ZANU(PF) youth, who 
defied the ‘spatial planning framework as reflected in existing legal and regulatory controls’.33
During the Inclusive Government, the firing and dismissal of MDC elected councillors 
and mayors by the ZANU(PF) minister continued unabated. In fact, ‘ZANU(PF) sought to 
undermine councils run by the MDC by all means possible; formal and otherwise’.34 Between 
September 2008 and January 2012, 21 councillors were suspended, with 16 of them totally 
dismissed by the minister of local government. Confirming political rivalry at the centre of urban 
governance struggles, all suspended councillors were from the MDC. Further, between May 
and June 2012, Chombo suspended the mayor, deputy mayor and one councillor in Chinhoyi 
municipality, who were all from the MDC.35
Political contradictions in Mutare city council further demonstrate ZANU(PF)’s appetite to 
destabilise MDC-run urban councils. Mutare city was dominated by MDC councillors under the 
leadership of MDC mayor Brian James. Despite significant progress by the local authority in 
improving service delivery, local challenges resulted in the mayor being suspended and finally 
dismissed.36 The mayor was evicted from his offices by ZANU(PF) youth under the supervision 
of Esau Mupfumi, a ZANU(PF) senior official in Mutare.37 The firing of MDC councillors 
became a well-established ZANU(PF) strategy to destabilise the functioning of local authorities.
In addition to the destabilising force from ZANU(PF), there were also internal party struggles 
in MDC-run councils. In February 2010, the MDC fired all its 24 councillors in Chitungwiza 
municipality, citing corruption, misdeeds and defiance to party directives. The MDC spokes-
person argued:
They [expelled councillors] are no longer MDC councillors. They have been fired for lack of 
good governance, accountability, failure to deliver and to live up to the mandate given them by 
the people. They have also been dismissed for defying the party. They have been fired for placing 
wrong priorities in the discharge of their duties – it’s a whole litany of complaints from residents 
and the party that has necessitated their dismissal.38
 30  Ibid., p. 246.
 31  EISA, Election Observer Mission Report Zimbabwe (Johannesburg, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2008).
 32  S. Chakaipa, ‘Local Government Institutions and Elections’, in J. de Visser, N. Steytler and N. Machinguta (eds), 
Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue (Cape Town, UWC Community Law Centre, 2010), 
p. 60.
 33  See A.Y. Kamete, ‘Planning versus Youth: Stamping Out Spatial Unruliness in Harare’, Geoforum, 39, 5 (2008), 
p. 1721.
 34  J. McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-Sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 39, 4 (2013), p. 784.
 35  D. Muchadenyika, ‘The Crisis of Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe’, in I. Chirisa (ed), Contemporary 
Rural and Urban Planning Issues in Zimbabwe: Implications for Policy and Planning (Palo Alto, Academica 
Press, 2013), p. 239.
 36  Mutare city council had won two Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce Cleanest City awards (2010 and 
2011) and Best Performing Urban Local Authority in Waste Management award at the 2013 Zimbabwe International 
Trade Fair.
 37  ‘Chombo Suspends Mutare Mayor’, Newsday, Harare, 28 January 2012.
 38  ‘MDC Fires Chitungwiza Councillors’, The Standard, Harare, 12 February 2010.
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The firing of MDC councillors in Chitungwiza followed the arrest and conviction of the 
 municipality’s mayor Israel Marange for corruption. Subsequently, there was disagreement 
between the MDC leadership and councillors on who should take over as mayor. However, the 
councillors remained in office as Chombo refused to dismiss them.
In April 2012, the MDC set up a probe team to investigate all MDC-controlled councils in 
the country. The party argued that the probe was aimed at reclaiming ‘Zimbabwe’s self-respect, 
a climate of accountability, and pushing for zero tolerance on corruption and all evils’.39 Based 
on the findings of the probe team, the MDC expelled 12 councillors in August 2012, citing 
corruption and mismanagement of office. However, minister Chombo did not suspend the 
councillors, arguing that the MDC did not inform the parent ministry of the allegations. The 
councillors continued in office since, according to the Urban Councils Act, suspension and 
dismissal powers are vested only in the local government minister.
Allocation of Housing Land in Urban Areas
Zimbabwe’s urban housing challenge is typified by shortages, overcrowding, obsolescence 
and the under-provision of infrastructure services. The official housing backlog stands at 1.25 
million housing units.40 Urban councils and the government are the two principal allocators of 
housing land in cities. Politics affects the land allocation and approval process. If one submits 
a land application proposal to any urban council, and if land is available and suitable for resi-
dential development, the council executive officials write a report in response to the application. 
The report is discussed and a decision is taken by the council land committee. If the council 
land committee approves, the decision is taken to full council, which takes a decision as advised 
by the land committee. However, ‘if council land committee is dominated by one party and 
full council dominated by another party, it complicates the process’.41
Section 152 of the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29: 15) provides conditions for the alien-
ation of council land. According to this Act, before selling, exchanging, leasing or donating 
any council land, the council is obliged to publish its intention to do so in two newspapers, 
making a copy of such notice public for 21 days in order to receive objections. The Urban 
Councils Act also mandates selling, exchanging, leasing or donating of land where there is a 
town planning scheme, with exceptions only possible with ministerial approval. This process 
was ‘often compromised and not followed as corruption syndicates were bolstered between 
council officials and political parties’.42
The stipulated land allocation process was not followed, as made evident by the post-
2000 invasion of peri-urban farms and demolition of houses during Operation Murambatsvina/
Restore Order (OM/RO) in 2005. Many houses in urban areas were destroyed, rendering 
close to a million people homeless. The operation seems to have had a political objective, as 
the ‘violence was wanton, symbolic and punitive, signifying ZANU(PF)’s determination to 
maintain power and social control in the face of a population who probably did not provide 
a majority vote for it, with areas who voted for the opposition MDC the worst affected’.43 
At the same time, ZANU(PF) capitalised on people invading land without following proper 
town planning procedures. A case in point is the way in which ZANU(PF) ‘saw mileage in 
 39  For the full press statement, see MDC, ‘National Executive Releases Names of Dismissed Councillors’, 29 
August 2012, available at http://www.mdc.co.zw/index.php/news/42-rokstories/1819-national-executive-releas-
es-names-of-dismissed-councillors.html, retrieved 15 January 2014.
 40  Government of Zimbabwe, Implementation Guide to the National Housing Delivery Programme 2014–2018 
(Harare, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, 2014).
 41  Interview with NGO worker, 20 June 2013.
 42  Interview with city official, Masvingo, 25 August 2013.
 43  S. Bracking, ‘Development Denied: Autocratic Militarism in Post-Election Zimbabwe’, Review of African Political 
Economy, 32, 104/105, Oiling the Wheels of Imperialism (2005), p. 342.
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Mbuya Nehanda housing co-operative and facilitated the regularisation and formalisation of 
the housing co-operative’.44 Post-2000 land allocations were inspired and driven by politics, 
relegating normal procedures. In some instances, after invading council, state or private land, 
land occupiers ‘facing evictions approached councillors to either seek reprieve or to be allo-
cated land somewhere’.45 People were using politics and political structures as a convenient 
way of accessing land.
State land is allocated by the state land office (in the local government ministry) ‘with 
provincial governors, and administrators and district administrators having great influence on 
who gets state land’.46 These provincial governors, administrators and district administrators 
are ZANU(PF)’s ‘ears and eyes’ at provincial and local level. ZANU(PF) politicised the land 
allocation process, usurping the powers of local authorities. Further, the allocation of state land 
is done through housing co-operatives, ‘most of which are ZANU(PF)-linked’.47 In essence, 
ZANU(PF) is in control of land, and party loyalists are the beneficiaries, though not allocated 
according to housing waiting lists. In housing co-operatives like Hatcliffe, Ushehokunze and 
Stoneridge farm, there is contestation between the city of Harare and government, as the 
former is ‘refusing’ to approve layout plans and connect water. These settlements are seen as 
ZANU(PF) projects spearheaded by the local government minister, evidence of a politicised 
and contested process.48
Urban councils have a prerogative to allocate land to councillors, though ‘it is problematic 
as it escalates a culture of entitlement’.49 In practice, councillors’ land entitlements covered 
high-, low-, and medium-density, and industrial areas, a clear sign of primitive accumulation. 
In addition, land accumulation by minister Chombo shows massive corruption in the housing 
sector (as the minister owns houses and stands in 16 of the 92 local authorities).50 Perhaps coun-
cillors looked upon the primitive accumulation conducted by the local government minister and 
concluded that participation in local government gives them entitlement to land and properties.
Between 2000 and 2004, the mere change of faces and benefit of new experience brought 
new dynamics to council decision-making processes. Land allocation changed, as councillors 
‘shared interests and mutual benefits when they got into office’.51 In terms of assets, ‘most 
MDC councillors had nothing, and thus prioritised amassing housing stands’.52 A former MDC 
councillor argued that MDC councillors ‘were interested in housing stands and office and not 
service delivery’.53 MDC councillors embroiled in land corruption became rich and powerful 
within the party. Corruption, incapability and a culture of clientelism became defining features 
 44  Interview with co-operative member, Mbuya Nehanda Housing Co-operative, 3 June 2013.
 45  Interview with councillor, Mutare, 23 May 2013.
 46  Interview with government planner, 17 June 2013.
 47  Interview with co-operative member, 15 July 2013.
 48  Interview with co-operative member, Ushehokunze, 6 July 2013; Hatcliffe, 14 August 2014.
 49  Interview with MDC official, Harvest House, 19 June 2013.
 50  2 Glen View houses, 2 flats in Queensdale, 1 property in Katanga Township, Stand Number 1037 Mount Pleasant 
Heights, 4 Norton business stands, 3 Chinhoyi business stands, 4 Banket business stands, 1 commercial stand in 
Epworth, 2 residential stands in Chirundu, 4 commercial stands in Kariba, 1 stand in Ruwa, 1 stand in Chinhoyi, 2 
stands in Mutare, 2 stands in Binga, 4 stands in Victoria Falls, 1 stand in Zvimba Rural, Chitungwiza (2 residential 
and 2 commercial stands), Beitbridge (4 stands), 20 stands in Crow Hill Borrowdale, 10 stands in Glen Lorne, 2 
flats at Eastview Gardens (B319 and B320), 1 flat at San Sebastian Flats in the Avenues Harare, 79 West Road, 
Avondale, Greendale house, Number 36 Cleveland Road Milton Park, Number 135 Port Road Norton, 2 Bulawayo 
houses, Number 18 Cuba Rd Mount Pleasant, Number 45 Basset Crescent Alexandra Park, 2 Chegutu houses, 
1Glen Lorne house (Harare), 2 houses (Victoria Falls), Stand along Simon Mazorodze Road, Norton (one stand), 
Avondale (two stands), 365 Beverly House (one stand), Bulawayo (three stands), Mica Point Kariba (one stand). 
See ‘Chombo, Wife Fight Over Assets’, The Herald, 4 November 2010.
 51  Interview with councillor, Harare, 6 June 2013.
 52  Ibid.
 53  Interview with former MDC councillor, 3 June 2013.
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of some MDC councillors.54 Such councillors used their ill-gotten wealth to pursue their political 
ambitions, despite incessant criticism from the party.
Council land is allocated by council to individuals using the council housing waiting list 
method, on a first come, first served basis. However, corruption rendered this method useless, 
as thousands have been on these lists for decades. There are ‘known cases of notable business 
people and politicians who bribe council officials to get housing stands overnight’.55 Examples 
include a former ZANU(PF) parliamentarian, Phillip Chiyangwa (nephew to Robert Mugabe), 
who acquired a total of 109 properties (mostly land) from councils, presumably through shady 
deals.56 Such primitive wealth accumulation, as reported in the state media, came into public 
view during the businessman’s divorce. Wealth accumulation (land and properties) by senior 
ZANU(PF) officials such as Phillip Chiyangwa and minister Chombo is part of ZANU(PF)’s 
‘blend of accumulation, power and violence for which no end is in sight’.57 Moreover, the 
conventional method of land allocation using the housing waiting list ‘has been compromised 
by corrupt councillors’.58 Councillors are of the view that as long as land is in their wards, they 
must have authority on land allocation. Within the City of Harare, ‘MDC councillors created 
some housing co-operatives though they have not occupied land’.59 Nevertheless, this facilitates 
corruption among councillors.
From a planning point of view, the process of acquiring a piece of land is very clear: for 
instance, compulsory acquisition or expansion of an urban area through government procla-
mation. None the less, ‘only in cases where ZANU(PF) had no interest, law would apply’.60 
Where the party had interests, law would not apply, as is made evident by the use of youth 
squads to grab land in cities. Most open spaces in Harare have been invaded by ZANU(PF) 
youth and supporters without council approval.61 In addition, the allocation of marketing stalls 
at Mupedzanhamo and Mbare Musika is controlled by ZANU(PF) functionaries with little 
influence from Harare city council.62
Further, central government, through FTLRP, acquired farms around cities. In the view 
of ZANU(PF), ‘giving land to MDC-run councils would entail promoting the MDC’.63 This 
brought a dilemma for ZANU(PF) in urban housing development, as central government could 
not provide land to urban councils. Instead, ZANU(PF) gave FTLRP-acquired peri-urban land, 
without services, directly to housing co-operatives, resulting in the sprouting of unplanned 
settlements around cities. The concept of housing co-operatives is noble and beneficial, but its 
politicisation brings many challenges to coherent urban development.
Farms surrounding cities have been allocated to co-operatives, ‘with a view to create new 
constituencies that are loyal to ZANU(PF)’.64 This strategy worked well on a pilot project in 
the constituency of Harare South, the only one within the capital city retained by ZANU(PF) 
 54  De Visser, Steytler and Machingauta (eds), Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe; Institute for a Democratic 
Alternative in Zimbabwe (IDAZIM), Local Governance in Transition: Zimbabwe’s Local Authorities During the 
Inclusive Government (Harare, RTI International and IDAZIM, 2010).
 55  Interview with Harare councillor, 22 July 2013.
 56  ‘Chiyangwa in Messy Sivorce’, The Herald, 29 November 2013; for a detailed analysis, see City of Harare, Special 
Investigations Committee’s Report on City of Harare’s Land Sales, Leases and Exchanges from the Period October 
2004 to December 2009 (Harare, City of Harare, 2010), pp. 1–54.
 57  D. Moore, ‘Progress, Power, and Violent Accumulation in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 
30, 1 (2012), pp. 1–9.
 58  Interview with former permanent secretary, 14 June 2013.
 59  Interview with NGO director, 20 June 2013.
 60  Interview with city planner, 15 June 2013.
 61  See Kamete, ‘Planning Versus Youth’.
 62  N. Kriger, ‘ZANU PF Politics under Zimbabwe’s “Power-Sharing” Government’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, 30, 1 (2012), pp. 11–26; McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City’.
 63  Interview with councillor, Masvingo, 28 June 2013.
 64  Interview with private developer, 30 July 2013.
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in elections conducted between 2000 and 2012. However, most housing co-operatives led by 
known ZANU(PF) functionaries have failed to deliver, and in many cases they have defrauded 
potential beneficiaries. This is substantiated by the findings of the Government of Zimbabwe’s 
Land Audit Report on land management and allocation in Chitungwiza. The Land Audit’s key 
findings are illegal allocation of 15,604 housing stands by ZANU(PF)-linked land barons, 
youths, housing co-operatives, council officials and councillors; uncoordinated incremental 
development (without any development plans); non-approval of housing co-operative plans; 
sub-standard buildings; flouting of town planning regulations and procedures, and high inci-
dence of contravention of safety and health standards (due to stands allocated in wetlands, and 
electricity, roads and sewerage servitudes).65
For most cities, available land for housing (in peri-urban farms) has been gazetted to become 
state land. As a result, acquiring urban land for purposes of urban expansion and housing 
requires negotiation with the ministries responsible for lands and local government. Urban 
councils found themselves with a need ‘to get land acquired under the FTLRP which counters 
the MDC programme for land distribution’.66 Councils rely on the benevolence of land minis-
ters and local government ministers to acquire land for housing, and ‘ZANU(PF) thwarts this 
process so as to restrain the governance of MDC councils’.67
Through the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10), ZANU(PF) uses the compulsory land 
acquisition process as a conduit to get land access. Intrinsically, ZANU(PF) ‘mobilised and 
capitalised on landless people’.68 In fact, ZANU(PF) rewarded FTLRP participants in urban 
areas with land and properties.69 The party invaded peri-urban farms and ‘allocated stands to 
ZANU(PF) supporters with the local government ministry giving lease agreements’.70 Some 
people in urban areas, especially low-income earners, have ‘taken advantage of political alle-
giance to ZANU(PF) to form co-operatives where they allocate themselves land and later push 
for the regularisation of such housing schemes’.71 Politics became a convenient tool for land 
access. A case in point is the Epworth Local Board, which won an eviction order in the High 
Court of Zimbabwe in 2001 against 6,000 informal settlers, many of whom had accessed land 
through ZANU(PF) structures and politicians.72 However, in some cases, political structures 
 65  The land barons are Frederick Mabamba’s (ZANU[PF] councillor, fired after the land deals investigation) United We 
Stand Co-operative, which illegally allocated and developed more than 5,000 stands, and Chigumba (ZANU[PF] 
MP), who allocated about 2,004 housing stands unprocedurally. Some co-operatives cited in the report for illegal 
allocation of land are Yemurai Disabled Co-operative, Chitungwiza Ruvimbo Housing Co-operative, Zimbabwe 
National Army’s Heritage Co-operative, Zanoremba and Face East. Most of the 26 co-operatives in the town 
‘fraudulently acquire state land working in cahoots with unscrupulous former councillors’ (named in the report) 
(p. 10). The report further notes that ‘a total of approximately US$20,423 million was paid by beneficiaries to 
co-operatives and land barons. The monies so paid were principally used for personal financial gain’ (p. 12). For 
detailed analysis, see Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH), Audit 
Report on Issues of Land Management and Allocation: Chitungwiza Town and Seke District, 4–22 November 
2013 (Harare, Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013), pp. 1–30.
 66  Interview with political analyst, 6 June 2013.
 67  Ibid.
 68  Interview with NGO director, 20 June 2013.
 69  Interview with urban planning consultant, 12 June 2013.
 70  Ibid. See also P.B. Matondi, Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform, (Uppsala, London, and New York, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet and Zed Books, 2012).
 71  Interview with councillor, Bulawayo, 19 July 2013.
 72  ZANU(PF) politicians and structures have refused to give consent to such an eviction order; see I.E.W. Chirisa 
and K. Muhomba, ‘Constraints to Managing Urban and Housing Land in the Context of Poverty: A Case of 
Epworth Settlement in Zimbabwe’, Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 
18, 8 (2013), pp. 950–64.
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came in after land occupation, as ‘ZANU(PF) took advantage of people benefiting through 
the FTLRP’.73
Housing co-operatives went beyond housing provision struggles, to include land reclamation, 
and challenged institutional arrangements for housing provision.74 The urban land question 
became more critical than ever in Zimbabwean history, as social movements (community-based 
organisations and co-operatives) challenged the conventional means of housing provision. Most 
housing co-operatives were ZANU(PF)-aligned; and most local authorities refused to accept 
these co-operatives, seeing them as ‘part of an illegal housing and urban planning system’.75 
Housing co-operatives are used as platforms for political membership mobilisation.76 Politically 
aligned housing co-operatives had easy access to housing land and have been used as a way 
of gathering votes and rewarding those active in local politics.77
Housing co-operatives are targets for political infiltration, especially during elections. Some 
co-operatives, such as Joshua M. Nkomo (in Harare), ‘force members allocated stands to 
register four of their family members in that political constituency for voting purposes’.78 
Housing-linked voter registration and voting is an attempt to use co-operatives to garner more 
party supporters in the urban constituency. In order to join ZANU(PF)-linked housing co- 
operatives, prospective members are asked to possess a ZANU(PF) membership card, even in 
MDC strongholds.79 The proliferation of housing co-operatives has therefore been political, as 
it enabled the managing of the ordinary person’s political life to some extent.80
Housing co-operatives have also posed serious threats to ecologically fragile lands. For 
instance, in Mutare, Gimboki Housing Scheme is developing part of Dangamvura and Chikanga, 
including areas which are unsuitable for human settlements – the Dangamvura scheme is ‘on 
a mountain slope posing threats of inhabitants getting drowned in cases of slope failure due to 
heavy and torrential rainfall’.81 In essence, politics is riding roughshod over issues of environ-
mental integrity and preservation, as well as planning principles.
Furthermore, allocation of housing land is characterised by confusion and contestation. 
For instance, land in Whitecliff, Harare, has been sold by the central government ‘though the 
land was being promised to other prospective land seekers by some politicians’.82 Moreover, 
the land in question here is at the centre of conflict between a private property owner (Pfugari 
Properties) and government. Elsewhere, a ZANU(PF) official was allocating land in Hopely, in 
Harare South. Further, in Manyame, ‘ZANU(PF) politicians were allocating land without the 
knowledge of Chitungwiza municipality’.83 Another senior ZANU(PF) official was allocating 
and selling housing stands nearer Harare International Airport, ‘where people believed that the 
“illegal” housing scheme was a front for the local government minister’.84 In many instances, 
land seekers are losing money in shoddy land deals spearheaded by ZANU(PF) politicians.
 73  Interview with NGO director, Mutare, 6 August 2013.
 74  L. Masuko, ‘War Veterans and the Re-emergence of Housing Co-operatives’, in S. Moyo, K. Helliker and T. 
Murisa (eds), Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe (Pietermaritzburg, 
S & S Publishers, 2008).
 75  D. Muchadenyika, ‘Slum Upgrading and Inclusive Municipal Governance in Harare, Zimbabwe: New Perspectives 
for the Urban Poor’, Habitat International, 48 (August 2015), p. 4.
 76  Interview with residents’ association director, 9 July 2013.
 77  I. Chirisa, M. Gaza, and E. Bandauko, ‘Housing Co-operatives and the Politics of Local Organization and 
Representation in Peri-Urban Harare, Zimbabwe’, African Studies Quarterly, 15,1 (2014), pp. 37–53.
 78  Interview with co-operative member, 15 July 2013.
 79  Interview with co-operative member, 19 July 2013.
 80  Interview with planning school lecturer, 17 August 2013.
 81  Interview with government planner, 6 August 2013.
 82  Interview with Whitecliff resident, 21 August 2013.
 83  Interview with Manyame resident, 25 June 2013.
 84  Interview with prospective home-owner, 28 July 2013.
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During the Inclusive Government, ZANU(PF) used parallel government structures that 
undermined the work of urban councils.85 In addition, ministries responsible for housing and 
urban land were controlled by two different political parties: MDC and ZANU(PF), respectively. 
The ministry responsible for land ‘allocated housing stands directly to beneficiaries’, thereby 
usurping and circumventing the role of the ministry responsible for housing, which was MDC-
controlled. 86 The effect has been the occupation of surveyed land without services, giving 
problems to urban local authorities, who do not have resources to build off-site infrastructure. 
The Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities (MoNHSA) has been forced to enter 
into partnership with land developers who possess land.87 As a result, MoNHSA partnered 
Sunway City, a subsidiary of Industrial Development Corporation, which had land to deliver 
housing stands in Harare. None the less, the housing stands ‘were not affordable to low-income 
earners and subsequently the housing waiting list could not be followed’.88
In addition, the construction of Willowvale flats in Harare was financed through a loan of 
US$25 million from the World Bank in 2009. Loan repayment necessitated housing units to be 
sold at higher price, so as to pay back the principal and interest. It is clear that such schemes 
are not balancing housing provision and affordability, as high-income earners benefit from such 
schemes. MoNHSA also runs its own housing projects; for instance, the ministry is developing 
and offering housing stands in White Cliff (Harare) and Lower Paradise Park (Marondera).
After 2010, land in general was no longer available in most cities. MDC-run councils typi-
cally had an acute shortage of serviced land and a critical shortage of housing.89 This presented 
the party with the challenge of using land and housing to buttress its support. For available 
small pieces of land, MDC tried to some extent to make its members benefit, for example ‘in 
Willowvale and Mufakose flats in Harare; and Kilan and Cowdry Park in Bulawayo city’.90 
The allocation of housing stands in Budiriro, Harare, shows the significant role of political 
parties. Harare City Council ‘allocated 2,000 housing stands in line with sympathetic MDC 
supporters’.91 However, ZANU(PF) members quickly invaded the housing stands, contesting 
the land allocation.
Existing land allocation methods are logically sound, though political dimensions are wor-
rying. As part of ZANU(PF) political strategy, the infills are supposed to be allocated to its 
supporters ‘as a way to dilute the opposition constituency strongholds and narrow the gap, as 
this becomes vital in national elections’.92 This strategy was executed through violence and 
patronage networks under parallel council structures.93
In general, land for housing in urban areas is lagging behind in terms of housing delivery. 
Shortage of land for low-cost housing in cities is made evident by 62 slums in the city of 
Harare.94 Most local authorities lack legally developed land suitable for the development of 
low-cost housing.95 Local authorities are hamstrung to meet the extent of housing need. At the 
same time, occupation of land around urban areas is politically motivated and led.
 85  Kriger, ‘ZANU PF Politics’.
 86  Interview with housing officer, 7 June 2013.
 87  Ibid.
 88  Ibid.
 89  McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City’.
 90  Interview with planning school lecturer, 26 July 2013.
 91  Ibid.
 92  Interview with private developer, 30 July 2013.
 93  See Kriger, ‘ZANU PF Politics’; McGregor ‘Surveillance and the City’.
 94  Dialogue on Shelter, Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation and City of Harare, Harare Slum Profiles Report: 
Edition 2 (Harare, Dialogue on Shelter and City of Harare, March 2014).
 95  UN–Habitat, UN–Habitat Zimbabwe Review of Activities in Zimbabwe since 2006: Towards a Comprehensive and 
Inclusive Human Settlement Development Strategy and Policy (Harare, UN–Habitat Zimbabwe, 2006).
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Developments in Council-Led Housing Schemes
The urban housing problem in Zimbabwe is similar to other critical shortages. The housing 
backlog is estimated to be over one million, though there is a no comprehensive assessment 
to substantiate this figure.96 The housing challenge was further aggravated by the infamous 
OM/RO, which destroyed housing and livelihoods of the poor.97 By 2000, most urban councils 
had stopped housing projects that aimed to give completed housing units.98 Instead, councils 
provided land only, with people providing infrastructure themselves.99 High land-servicing 
costs and the economic challenges constrained development in council-led housing.100 Councils 
were struggling even to pay salaries, and the situation became worse after the dollarisation 
period in January 2009. Central government could no longer provide Public Sector Investment 
Project (PSIP) grants to local authorities. This development led to the dominance of housing 
delivery by private players, community-based organisations, co-operatives and company- 
assisted housing projects.101
Prior to 2000, local authorities benefited from the Housing Guarantee Fund, National 
Housing Fund, PSIP, and partnerships with building societies in housing delivery. By 2003, 
there had been a decline in housing provision in urban areas, from an annual average of 
15,000–20,000 units, during the period 1985–1995, to a meagre 5,000 units in 2000.102 Up 
to 2000, local authorities had access to low-interest loans, both on the open market and from 
government. This was possible because government had access to long-term low-interest loans 
from the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
extended over periods of 25–30 years, with an annual interest rate of 4–5 per cent. Zimbabwe 
failed to pay its debt to multilateral financial institutions, resulting in the country becoming 
restricted to costly loans, at interest rates of 18–25 per cent per annum.
A decline in housing finance resulted in a decline in housing delivery. For some time, ‘local 
authorities facilitated housing delivery through providing off-site infrastructure’.103 Grants 
and loans from development agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and the World 
Bank, which helped cities to provide off-site infrastructure, could no longer be extended.104 
Investing in off-site infrastructure is expensive because of high initial capital outlay. The city 
of Harare does not have the infrastructure capacity to support new housing developments. 
For example, the sewerage treatment and water capacity is not sufficient to support even an 
additional 100,000 housing units. To that end, ‘the Iranian project aimed at building between 
15,000 and 20,000 housing units in Harare failed due to insufficient infrastructure’.105
Zimbabwe’s urban planning is shaped around the British planning system of spacious 
stands, quality building materials, and expensive, generous infrastructure. However, most 
 96  Government of Zimbabwe, National Housing Policy 2012 (Harare, Ministry of National Housing and Social 
Amenities, 2012).
 97  A.Y. Kamete, ‘Interrogating Planning’s Power in an African City: Time for Reorientation?’, Planning Theory 
11, 1 (2012), pp. 66–88.
 98  Muchadenyika, ‘Slum Upgrading’.
 99  This is the practice for all land allocated by local authorities to housing co-operatives and consortiums in the 
post-2000 era.
100  Muchadenyika, ‘Slum Upgrading’.
101  D. Muchadenyika, ‘Contestation, Confusion and Change: Urban Governance and Service Delivery in Zimbabwe 
(2000–2012)’, M.Phil thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2014.
102  N. Marongwe, S. Mukoto and K. Chatiza, Scoping Study: Governance of Urban Land Markets in Zimbabwe 
(Harare, Urban Landmark, 2011).
103  Interview with city planner, 21 August 2013.
104  For detailed information of USAID, SIDA and World Bank contribution to housing in Zimbabwe, see E. Ramsamy, 
The World Bank and Urban Development (London and New York, Routledge, 2006).
105  Interview with city planner, 21 August 2013.
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urban councils have accepted that the current housing delivery approach is untenable. The 
2012 national housing policy reviewed the expensive conception of urban planning and hous-
ing delivery through allowing incremental development and emphasising the importance of 
community-based organisations.106 In addition, cities have refocused internally, using different 
kinds of technology to make habitable houses, as well as ‘reducing off-site infrastructure’.107 
For Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare, the review of local development plans resulted in densi-
fication, the reduction of building lines, stand sizes, and roads, and creating semi-detached 
houses, which in reality are an acceptance that there are no resources.108 Cities are also allowing 
the construction of housing and infrastructure to start simultaneously (parallel development).
Partnership arrangements that are not exclusively council projects have increased in mag-
nitude. The urban councils provide the land and the developer provides the required infra-
structure. The council role is thus limited to land allocation and development control rather 
than ownership of housing projects. When housing provision is driven solely by a public 
sector institution, issues of affordability can be catered for. The reverse is true in the case of 
housing provision by private entities. The City of Harare and Zimbabwe Building Society 
partnership housing stands ‘were unaffordable to low-income households’.109 The largest post- 
independent housing initiative, the Old Mutual, Central African Building Society (CABS) 
and City of Harare housing project in Budiriro (Harare), aimed at delivering 5,000 stands, is 
attributed to a networked MDC mayoral leadership.110 However, eligibility for the CABS–City 
of Harare partnership required a CABS bank account and a defined income bracket, making it 
difficult for ultra-low-income households to benefit. For low-cost housing delivery, city council 
partnerships with profit-oriented organisations subvert issues of affordability. Table 1 shows 
City of Harare partnership housing projects.
Within Harare, the only partnership project that helped the ultra-low-income groups is a 
slum upgrading project in Dzivarasekwa Extension (Harare), supported by the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation.111 The project provided not only 480 tenured housing stands but also expan-
sive infrastructure services (water, sewerage, roads). It initially earmarked Mbare, the oldest 
suburb in Harare, but ‘ZANU(PF) claimed 51 per cent of the housing units’,112 an indication of 
anti-developmental patrimonialism. The ZANU(PF) youth vigilante group Chipangano warned 
that if its members were not guaranteed to be 51 per cent of beneficiaries, the project would not 
commence. Chipangano play a key role in maintaining ZANU(PF)’s urban patronage system, 
hijacking council property and functions in Harare’s central Mbare district, where it controls 
the city’s major markets and bus termini.113 Due to political contestation in Mbare, the project 
was subsequently moved to Dzivarasekwa Extension, a settlement where people went after the 
1991 and 2005 government-led evictions.
To put into perspective the other cities, Table 2 shows city–private sector partnership housing 
projects in Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that local authorities 
are constrained to deliver housing projects without partnerships. However, Table 2 shows huge 
106  Government of Zimbabwe, National Housing Policy 2012. Government defines incremental development as a 
housing development strategy that allows the developer to start constructing essential services such as water and 
sanitation and allows beneficiaries to occupy their stands.
107  Interview with housing director, 30 June 2013.
108  Ibid.
109  Interview with NGO worker, 20 June 2013.
110  Interview with Harare city planner, 18 June 2013; the project is attributed to the work of the City of Harare MDC 
Mayor Muchadei Masunda (2008–13).
111  For detailed analysis of this project, see D. Muchadenyika, ‘Slum Upgrading’, pp. 1–10.
112  Interview with Mbare resident, 14 July 2014.
113  McGregor, ‘Surveillance and the City’.
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variance between number of stands allocated and completed houses. Presumably, this shows that 
these council–private sector housing partnerships are slow in delivering the final housing stock.
Operation Garikai is the only government-directed universal project that has resulted in 
the provision of low-cost housing in the cities of Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare between 
2000 and 2012, as shown in Table 3. Operation Garikai was a government housing programme 
led by the Zimbabwe National Army in the aftermath of the OM/RO. Government partici-
pation in actual land servicing and house construction was through the flagship Operation 
Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, which, however, has remained a modest contribution to addressing 
housing shortages in Zimbabwe.114 At present, Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle faces severe 
114  K. Chatiza and A. Mlalazi, Human Settlement Needs Assessment in Zimbabwe: Critical Review and Proposed 
Methodology (Harare, UN–Habitat and Government of Zimbabwe, 2009).
Table 1. City of Harare housing partnership projects (2008–2011)
Source: City Of Harare Department of Housing and Community Services, Department of Housing and Community 
Services Annual Report 2011 (Harare, City of Harare, 2012)
Name of project Year started No. of housing units/residential stands
Slum Upgrading Project Dzivarasekwa 2011 480 stands
CABS Project in Budiriro 2009 5,000 units
IDBZ 2008 72 units
CYBC (Mabvuku) 2007 42 stands
Shelter Zimbabwe (Chizhanje area, Mabvuku) – 6,000–7,000 stands
Pearl Properties 2010 Block of flats (132 units)
Glaudina Housing Development 2007 1,351 stands
Table 2. Council–private sector partnerships in the cities of Mutare, Masvingo and Bulawayo
Source: Adapted from S. Mapurisa, ‘Local Authorities’ Rapid Response to Housing Delivery in Zimbabwe’, in K. 
Chatiza (ed.), Urban Housing and Community Services Delivery in Zimbabwe: A Compendium of Selected Papers 
Presented At Housing Directors’ Forum Meetings (Harare, UN–Habitat and UCAZ [HDF], 2012), p. 57
Developer No. of stands allocated Completed houses Houses under construction
MUTARE
Aloe Enterprises 617 500 117
Pegasus 693 85 0
ZIMTA 1,381 100 188
Aloe Enterprises 130 0 0
Dream House 333 0 0
Total 3,154 685 305
MASVINGO
Treasure Consultants 500 16 21
KPM International 500 0 0
Mac Dowell 20 0 20
Steel Makers 7 6 1
NSSA 653 0 0
ZIMRE 437 0 0
Total 2,117 22 42
BULAWAYO
Aggregate Properties 1,00 6 17
Glendinning 1,004 244 204
Habek Deug 207 125 73
Bopse 381 197 205
ZIGEU 500 425 75
Standard Products 377 0 4
GG 116 0 0
Hardware 118 45 32
Glenkara Homes 1,702 696 150
Total 4,505 1,738 610
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challenges of infrastructure servicing, completing the houses and handing over the projects 
to local authorities.
Housing Delivery Outside Council Initiatives
The economies of urban Zimbabwe have been in crisis since the late 1980s, resulting in local 
authorities failing to deliver adequate housing, education, health and other services.115 As a 
result, in terms of housing delivery, non-state actors provided a higher quantity than local 
authorities. This can be attributed to capacity challenges and changes in the housing delivery 
system. Dialogue on Shelter, the technical partner supporting urban poor housing, suggested 
that ‘government is not efficient in housing delivery’.116 Alternatively, government could create 
enabling conditions, such as housing finance and bye-laws. Urban social movements, such as 
the Alliance of Dialogue on Shelter and Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation, managed to 
deliver 15,000 tenured stands and 3,000 housing units to its members.117
Through the national housing loan development facility, central government explored joint 
ventures with the private sector and local authorities in delivering housing. The majority of these 
joint ventures, however, cater for medium- and high-income earners. Table 4 shows government 
joint ventures in Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Mutare in delivering high-density housing.
Co-operatives and savings groups played a significant role in terms of housing delivery for 
low-income communities. In particular, ‘these developments were concentrated in peri-urban 
areas, using incremental housing development, though infrastructure services are poor’.118 This 
is largely due to the flexibility of these groups, which enabled them to survive in a hyperin-
flationary environment. Despite these attempts, ‘the challenge is how to increase the scale of 
these operations’.119 Scalability and changing the regulatory framework are key considerations 
in addressing low-cost housing concerns. Urban housing co-operatives are normally preoc-
cupied with quantities of housing units delivered.120 Official government statistics reveal that, 
cumulatively, community-based organisations delivered over 10,000 units (serviced stands 
115  A.Y. Kamete, ‘“At the Bottom of the Social Heap”: A Youth Underclass in Inner-City Harare?’, Journal of Youth 
Studies, 9, 1 (2006), pp. 67–89.
116  Interview with NGO director, 20 June 2013.
117  Figures collated from Dialogue on Shelter Statistics.
118  Interview with planning school lecturer, 6 June 2013.
119  Interview with NGO worker, 20 June 2013.
120  A.Y. Kamete, ‘Revisiting the Urban Housing Crisis in Zimbabwe: Some Forgotten Dimensions?’, Habitat 
International, 30, 4 (2006), pp. 981–95.
Table 3. Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle projects
Source: Adapted from S. Mapurisa, ‘Local Authorities’ Rapid Response to Housing Delivery in Zimbabwe’, in K. 
Chatiza (ed.), Urban Housing and Community Services Delivery in Zimbabwe: A Compendium of Selected Papers 
Presented At Housing Directors’ Forum Meetings (Harare, UN–Habitat and UCAZ [HDF], 2012), p. 56
Location Stands allocated Houses completed Houses under construction
MUTARE
Garikai Phase I Chikanga 3 537 272 31 




7,000 200 718 
MASVINGO
Runyararo NorthGarikai I 340 100 240 
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and finished houses),121 while building societies delivered more than 40,000 units. Thus non-
state actors kept some reasonable momentum in housing delivery.122 Between 2000 and 2012, 
the City of Harare allocated 12,554 housing stands to 254 housing co-operatives, with 2,301 
housing units completed.123 During the same period, the City of Harare could not deliver any 
housing project on its own without partnerships.
Housing co-operatives have been effective, but in some cases managers defrauded members 
for their personal benefit, without delivering on agreed goals. In November 2013, this prompted 
the local government minister to issue a directive compelling all co-operative members to stop 
paying contributions.124 In reality, people are suffering, ‘as some co-operative leaders, known 
ZANU(PF) functionaries, continued forcing people to pay or risk losing housing stands’.125 
Most housing co-operatives are dominated by ZANU(PF) in terms of membership and lead-
ership, making these housing schemes highly politicised.126 Low-cost housing projects have 
been hijacked by politics, as a government planner observes:
I have attended several co-operatives including the one currently developing Hatcliffe Extension. 
ZANU(PF) slogans are the norm before every member passes any message during co-operative 
meetings. The co-operative got that land through the local government minister, despite several 
court contestations by the land owner.127
The pace of development in co-operative housing schemes is very slow, owing partially to 
the small monthly member contributions (US$20–100). The money covers all administration 
costs and development activities such as water, sewerage and road construction. Despite this 
 observation, Table 5 shows the expansion of low-cost housing outside the council in the city 
of Mutare.
Of course, housing provision during the period 2000–2013 was hindered by the melting 
down of the economy. Despite these challenges, Shelter Zimbabwe, as a single private company, 
121  However, this number can be an underestimate, as statistics collated from Harare alone indicates that the city 
allocated 12,554 stands to 254 housing co-operatives between 2000 and 2012. Further, the Zimbabwe Homeless 
People’s Federation statistics indicates that the movement facilitated access to 15,000 housing stands to its members 
between 1998 and 2014. See ‘Muchadenyika, ‘Slum Upgrading’.
122  MoNHSA, National Housing Policy Roll-out Report (Harare, Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities, 
2013).
123  Statistics collated from the City of Harare Housing Co-operatives Register.
124  ‘New Measures to Govern Co-operatives’, The Herald, 5 November 2013.
125  Interview with co-operative member, 29 June 2013.
126  Interview with government planner, 15 July 2013.
127  Ibid.
Table 4. National Housing Loan Development Facility joint ventures
Source: MEPIP, ‘First Annual Medium Term Plan (2011–2015)’, pp. 127–8
Location Project Status % complete
Harare Dzivarasekwa 800 high-density stands  
300 mm-diameter sewer line 
Roads, sewerage and water 
reticulation services
30%
Bulawayo Parklands Home Link 137 high-density stands 
Roads, sewerage and water 
reticulation services
70%
Masvingo Nemanwa 300 stands  
Roads, sewerage and water 
reticulation services
5%
Mutare Chikanga 201 high-density stands 
Roads, sewerage and water 
reticulation services
100%
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developed 1,167 housing stands in Harare and Epworth between 2000 and 2012.128 Of these 
stands, 821 covered high-density areas. These projects have been completed and duly awarded 
certificates of compliance by the relevant local authorities.
From the foregoing, it is clear that low-cost housing is no longer spearheaded by local 
authorities, but through housing co-operative schemes, private companies and other low-income 
groups. The role of the council has been limited to land allocation. Cumulatively, low-cost 
housing schemes outside council initiatives have contributed significantly to housing delivery. 
The challenge is that housing co-operatives circumvent urban planning laws and, in some cases, 
the housing waiting list. Council urban services management is riddled with corruption, ‘as 
urban councils are taking money without making sure there is proper compliance to services 
infrastructure’.129 The situation is further aggravated by housing co-operatives in which people 
are refusing to pay for urban services, arguing that they were not allocated land by councils. 
Rather, they recognise central government, and, in particular, the local government ministry 
that allocated them land.
Conclusion
If a system is confronted and threatened by internal and external exigencies over a period of 
time, then change is often imminent. However, urbanist Edgar Pieterse argues that most urban 
struggles require ‘incremental change, which is the only way of intervening in conditions of 
profound complexity and entrenched power dynamics embedded in capitalist modernities’.130 
Incremental development is now an important housing development strategy in Zimbabwean 
cities, predominantly being used by housing co-operatives and other self-help groups. This 
suggests an acceptance of the view that conventional housing delivery methods, in which 
government and local authorities provide serviced stands and completed housing units, are 
no longer possible.
Edward Ramsamy’s assessment is that ‘Zimbabwe’s critical shortage of housing for the 
low-income urban poor ranks next to unemployment as the most serious problem confronting 
128  Interview with property manager, 14 July 2013.
129  Interview with property owner, 16 August 2013.
130  E. Pieterse, City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development (London and New York, Zed Books, 
2008), p. 6 (emphasis in original).
Table 5. Housing projects in the City of Mutare
Source: Adapted from City of Mutare, City of Mutare Integrated Development Plan (2010–13) (Mutare, City of 
Mutare, 2010)
Name of project Number of units Project status
Chikanga infill housing scheme 166 stands Being serviced with water, 
sewerage and roads.
Hobhouse III high-density 
residential scheme
±1,432 stands 1,200 stands have water and  
sewerage. Occupied already.
Greenside low-density scheme 181 stands Occupied since 2005. No roads.
Shangani (Murambi West) 
residential infill
32 stands Stands allocated in 2003 and 2008. 
No services.
Birkley South 180 low-density residential stands Allocated in 2008. No services.
Dangamvura golf course 54 high-density stands Finalising roads.
Dreamhouse housing scheme 365 high-density residential stands Roads outstanding. Water and  
sewerage partially completed.
Beira Corridor phase 1 320 low-density residential stands Roads and sewerage on course.
Gimboki South 5,500 high-density residential 
scheme
Yet to start. Run by Gimboki 
Housing Consortium.
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the country in the post-independence period’.131 Despite this, the role of city councils in pro-
viding housing has fallen drastically, placing the country’s existing urban housing stock under 
severe stress. Instead, housing co-operatives and private companies are providing significant 
new housing in urban areas. Furthermore, central government, through its ministries and 
agencies, has contributed to housing provision through developing housing in compulsorily 
acquired land – for example, Dzivarasekwa (Harare), Chikanga (Mutare), Parklands Home Link 
(Bulawayo) and Nemanwa (Masvingo).132 The sharp rise of co-operatives in housing delivery 
brought challenges for councils in terms of properly monitoring and managing housing devel-
opment in urban areas. This is mainly because the administration of housing co-operatives is 
deeply entangled in political struggles.
Zimbabwe’s urban politics is profoundly contested, making housing provision tenuous and 
politically motivated. Urban politics is composed of ‘various overlapping and mutually impli-
cated institutional sites of engagement and contestation’.133 Players involved in urban politics 
include political parties; local governments, social movements, community-based organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, and the private sector, among others. The interaction among 
these players determines the production and delivery of urban services. Service delivery in 
general has been marked by contestations and contradictions, particularly in the delivery of 
low-income housing.
Such political struggles for the control of Zimbabwe’s urban areas are leaving an urban 
dilemma, of the sort described by Mamdani as spatially and administratively disconnected local 
governance structures, which, reinforced by economic and social exclusion, leave large parts of 
the population within cities voiceless and without political leverage over their own destinies.134 
The general public, especially the urban poor, have lost confidence in local authorities, owing 
partly to these unresolved housing struggles. For instance, if the urban poor build their own 
houses, city councils and central government often demolish such houses, using planning law 
and regulations as a façade. Briefly stated, there is a growing tendency of rapid social and 
economic exclusion in Zimbabwean cities, characterised by the criminalisation of ‘informal’ 
urban economic activities and settlements.
Perhaps the central argument of this article is that the control of land in urban areas is an 
important factor in shaping urban development. The Zimbabwean experience shows that it is 
insufficient for a party to be voted into power; rather, controlling the resource base, including 
land, is an important consideration in shaping urban development. ZANU(PF) did not run 
city governments, but it had control of urban resources. This made the party a de facto ruling 
regime in urban areas, even where its MDC opponents ostensibly controlled the councils. This 
raises questions about the feasibility and functionality of opposition-controlled African cities.
In the absence of a functional urban government system, which can facilitate or provide 
affordable and decent accommodation, the prevalence of slum-like settlements characterised by 
‘overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to safe water and sanitation, and 
insecurity of tenure’ increase.135 As such, housing for the urban poor is under immense stress, 
as made evident by 62 slum settlements in Harare, with an estimated 37,936 households and 
approximately 165,609 people.136 Urban life in such settlements is characterised by squalid 
131  E. Ramsamy, The World Bank and Urban Development: From Projects to Policy (London and New York, Routledge, 
2006), p. 167.
132  MEPIP, First Annual Medium Term Plan (2011–2015) Implementation Progress Report 2012 (Harare, Ministry 
of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion, 2012).
133  E. Pieterse, City Futures, p. 11.
134  M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1996).
135  UN–Habitat, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003 (London, Earthscan, 2003).
136  Dialogue on Shelter, Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation and City of Harare, ‘Harare Slum Upgrading 
Profile Report’.
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living conditions: shacks made of plastics and cardboard boxes, shallow wells and absence of 
sanitation facilities. The success of urban councils in housing provision was muted by both 
political and financial crises. Consequently, councils could provide only unserviced land to 
housing co-operatives and self-help groups. None the less, ‘if housing is only about a roof, 
housing co-operatives and self-help groups performed well, though infrastructure provision 
in these areas remains a tremendous challenge’.137 Most new settlements do not have running 
water, reticulated sewerage or surfaced roads,;but have features reminiscent of rural areas, such 
as shallow wells, pit latrines and gravel roads . It would seem that civilisation is in reverse in 
Zimbabwean cities.
Council-led housing schemes benefited middle-income people, such as civil servants, and 
not low-income individuals. A case in point is the Willowvale flats in Harare, which were built 
as a low-cost housing project but ended up benefiting high-income groups. Outside council 
housing, initiatives specifically by community-based organisations and co-operatives have 
contributed more to the delivery of low-cost housing. Council partnerships with private firms 
concentrated mainly on medium- and low-density housing projects, owing to the profit motive 
of private capital.
Clearly, then, councils have redefined their role from a provider of housing to only a vir-
gin-land allocator and regulator of private and co-operative housing developments. There is not 
a single housing project wholly undertaken by the city councils of Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo 
or Mutare since 2000. At the same time, councils have allocated land to various co-operatives 
and private developers. As a result, the private sector and co-operative movement have made 
the most significant contribution to housing development in urban areas. The consequence, 
perhaps predictably, has been a decline in the health and well-being of people living in new 
settlements without access to reticulated water and sanitation and other social service facilities.
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137  Interview with planning school lecturer, 6 June 2013.
